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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
MARK GRAY, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
CASE NO. 870026-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE 
May the Court enter judgment and sentence on a Defendant 
where, in conjunction with pleading guilty, he protests his 
innocence, without the Court first determining that there is 
a factual basis for the plea. 
DETERMINATIVE RULE 
Rule of Practice 3.6, Pleas of Guilty... 
(e) Determining Factual Basis for Plea. The Court 
shall not enter final judgment on a plea of guilty 
without first determining that there is a factual 
basis for the plea, and that all requirements of 
law for acceptance of a guilty plea have been met. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
The Defendant entered pleas of guilty to five felonies 
at the time of arraignment in District Court. At the time 
of entering his pleas, the Defendant protested his 
1 
innocence. The Court made no determination as to a factual 
basis for the plea prior to entering judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On December 29, 1986, at his arraignment in District 
Court, the Defendant pled guilty to all five counts on an 
information charging two felony counts of burglary of a 
building, and one count each of theft of an operable motor 
vehicle, theft of a firearm, and felony theft, all second 
degree felonies. 
When the Court asked the Defendant what his plea was, 
he responded, "I didn't do it, but I'm pleading guilty" 
(Transcript p.4, 1.5). This entry of plea was not on advice 
of counsel (Transcript p.4, 1.10 and p. 5, 1.8). The 
Defendant had earlier waived his preliminary hearing 
(Transcript p.2, 1.14). 
It appeared that the primary motivating factor in the 
Defendant's hurry to plead guilty and be sentenced was s 
strong aversion to the CAche County jail. The Defendanl 
waived a pre-sentence report when informed it would taki 
four weeks. "I can't go to prison and wait until then? 
just want to get out of jail" (Transcript p.8, 1.8). 
The Court did find that the plea was voluntar 
(Transcript p.7, 1.19). However, the Court did nc 
determine that there was a factual basis for the plea befos 
entering judgment and sentence. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Rule of Practice 3.6 (c) requires that the Court shall 
not enter final judgment on a plea of guilty without first 
determining that there is a factual basis for the plea. In 
a situation such as in the instant case where the Defendant 
protests his innocence at the time he pleads guilty, the 
State has an interest in insuring that innocent people are 
not convicted and uncovering circumstances rendering a plea 
involuntary which would not otherwise come to light. 
ARGUMENT 
Rule of Practice 3.6 (c) was not followed in this case 
and the Defendant has appealed his conviction, still 
protesting his innocence. Part C of Rule 3.6 imposes a duty 
of determining that there is a factual basis for the plea in 
addition to making a finding of voluntariness. The 
importance of this rule was recognized by the Utah Supreme 
Court in STATE vs FORSYTH, 560 P.2d 337 (1977) were it was 
stated: 
We recognize, of course, that it is the duty of 
the trial court to see that the interests of 
justice are served by now Csic] allowing a person 
to enter a plea of guilty to a crime he has not 
committed." p. 339 
It should be clear from the context of the above quote, 
that the word "now" is a misprint and should have been 
spelled "not". The Court held that the trial court in that 
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case had indeed ascertained that there was a sufficient 
factual basis by hearing from prosecution and defense 
counsel a summary of their evidence at the time of accepting 
the plea. 
The specific situation of a Defendant protesting his 
innocence in conjunction with entering a guilty plea was 
dressed in NORTH CAROLINA vs. ALFQRD, 400 U.S. 25, 91 SCT 
160, 27 LEd2d 162. The Defendant there had pursuant to a 
plea bargain, pled guilty to second degree murder to avoid 
the risk of a death penalty, but stated that he was 
innocent. The Defendant then alleged a violation of his 
constitutional rights of Due Process. The Court held that 
there was no constitutional error in accepting a guilty plea 
which contains a protestation of innocence when "a Defendant 
intelligently concluded that his interest required entry of 
a guilty plea and the record before the judge contains 
strong evidence of actual quilt." (Emphasis added) 400 U.S. 
37. 
The record before the judge in the instant case 
involved no record of evidence of actual guilt. Thus, no^ 
only does there exist a violation of Rule of Practice 3.6 
but the error is of constitutional proportions, being i 
violation of the Defendant's rights to Due Process bot 
under the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the Unite 
State Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the Uts 
Constitution. 
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This constitutional dimension of the trial court's duty 
to ascertain a factual basis for a guilty plea was 
recognized in the Washington case, IN RE BARR, 684 P. 2d 712 
(1984) in which it was held that a rule of criminal 
procedure similar to our own Rule of Practice 3.6 <c) was 
intended to insure that the constitutional "voluntary-
intelligent" standard was met. 
Defendant, Mark Gray, in stating that he didn't commit 
the offense charged, and in further implying that his 
primary motivating factor was to escape the clutches of the 
Cache County Jail, has been denied the benefit of one of our 
court rules designed not only to save foolish defendants 
from their own mistakes, but to uphold two basic public 
policies. First, that innocent people should not be sent to 
prison, and second, that voluntariness of a plea can better 
be determined if an inquiry is made as to a factual basis 
for the plea. These policies also help to uphold the 
integrity of the criminal justic system itself. 
While the FORSYTH case recognized that trial court are 
not bound to any rigid procedure in ascertaining the factual 
basis for a plea, the failure to use any procedure in the 
context of protestations of innocence should constitute 
clear and reversible error. 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant has been denied his rights of Due Process 
5 
under the Utah Constitution and the United States 
Constitution and has been denied the benefit of Rule of 
Practice 3.6 (c) and his case should be remanded to the 
District Court so that the Defendant can withdraw his pleas 
of guilty and for further proceedings thereafter. 
DATED: u^tyC ll i / 1 % 7 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED: 
Nathan Hult 
Attorney for 
Appellant 
Defendant-
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff and Respondent, : 
vs. i CASE NO. 870026-CA 
MARK GRAY, t 
Defendant and Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
It appearing that the State concedes the substantive issues 
in the appeal, the only remaining issue is as follows: When a 
Defendant raises a constitutional issue on appeal and that 
person's liberty is at stake, may this court consider the appeal 
and reverse the conviction because his guilty plea was 
involuntary when the Defendant failed to file a Mot(ion to 
Withdraw his Plea after his conviction and sentencer 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure does not provide for 
withdrawal of a guilty plea after conviction and sentence, and 
because this case deals with substantive constitutional issues 
and effects the liberty of the Defendant, this case is properly 
before this Court. 
ARGUMENT 
The State appears to concede the substantive issues in this 
case. (See footnote 1 on page 4 of Brief of Respondent) Rather, 
the State raises a procedural issue that the Defendant should 
have made a motion to withdraw his plea of guilty prior to 
bringing this appeal. This argument appears to be based upon a 
belief that a motion under Section 77-13-6 of the Utah Code, 
1986-87 may be brought at any time after conviction and sentence. 
A reasonable reading of that section does not support that 
contention, nor does the State cite any decision in support of 
that proposition. 
Section 77-13-6 provides: 
A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior 
to conviction. A plea of guilty or no contest may 
withdrawn only upon good cause shown and with leave of 
court. 
While the phrase "prior to conviction" is attached to the 
first sentence, the second sentence appears to merely add greater 
limitations in cases of withdrawal of a plea of guilty or no 
contest. The section does not grant authority to the Court to 
entertain a Motion to Withdraw a Plea of Guilty or No Contest 
after sentence or conviction. 
The State correctly states that a Motion for a new trial 
must be made within 10 days after imposition of sentence, but 
this is a specific grant of jurisdiction to the District Court 
after conviction and sentence. No such provision is made with 
regards to withdrawal of a guilty plea. 
The State further points out that in State vs. Breckenridqei 
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688 P2d 440 (Utah 1983), the Court found an exception, in 
situations where a person's liberty is at stake, to the general 
rule that a constitutional issue could not be raised on appeal if 
not raised at trial. That is the situation in this case. The 
Breckenridqe case further stated: 
...Cdluring oral argument on appeal, Breckenridqe 
addressed for the first time the argument that his 
right to due process was violated because his guilty 
plea was accepted by the Court without his 
understanding of the nature and elements of arson and 
without a showing that there was any factual basis upon 
which to base conviction of a crime. <p. 443) 
While the Defendant in Breckenridqe had filed a motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea in the trial court, which was denied, 
that case specifically dealt with the situation where such a 
motion was filed prior to entry of conviction and sentence. 
Also, there is no substantial difference between the Breckenridqe 
case and the case at hand due to the fact that the constitutional 
issues addressed in the Breckenridqe decision were not raised on 
the Motion to Withdraw a Plea in that case. The Court could have 
easily said in that case that the Defendant had not failed to 
exhaust his administrative remedies with regards to those 
constitutional issues raised for the first time on appeal and 
required that he first file a new Motion to Withdraw his Plea 
prior to the Court addressing those issues. The Court did not 
require that. 
The cases cited by the State from other jurisdictions do not 
deal with the issue of whether the trial court can entertain a 
motion to withdraw a plea of guilty after conviction and 
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sentence. In the case of State vs. Blair, 421 P2d 22 (kansas 
1966) the opinion only refers to complaints of the appellant 
regarding entry of his plea and does not state whether any of the 
issues were of a constitutional dimension. In the case of State 
vs. Myers, 471 P2d 294 (Arizona Appellate 1970), the issue was 
whether a plea as a result of a plea bargain could be addressed 
on an appeal, the court stating that in cases of a negotiated 
plea, the Defendant must first petition the trial court to set 
aside his plea (p. 295). The reasoning of that decision was that 
a Defendant must decide whether he wanted to be free of the 
entire plea bargain and that proposition could best be handled in 
the trial court. The case did not deal with the issue of whether 
or not there was a procedure for making a motion to set aside a 
plea after conviction and sentence. 
In the case of State vs. Brakeman, 538 P2d 795 (New Mexico 
1975), the court indicated, 
Defendants intimate there may not be a way of raising, 
in the trial court, an issue as to the trial court's 
procedure. The intimation is not correct. 
However, neither the Brakeman case nor any of the cases cited in 
that decision refer to any procedure after conviction and 
sentence for making a Motion to Withdraw a Plea. Indeed, two of 
the New Mexico cases cited in the Brakeman case, State vs. 
McClarron, 512 P2d 1274 (Court of Appeal New Mexico 1973), and 
State vs. Kincheloe, 528 P2d 893 (Court of Appeals New Mexicc 
1974), both involve situations where a Motion to Withdraw a Pies 
was made before sentencing. Neither of the other cases cited ii 
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the Brakeman case dealt with withdrawal of a guilty plea. In the 
present case, the Defendant was sentenced on the same day as he 
entered a pl^a, and there was no interval of time to move to 
withdraw his plea prior to conviction and sentence. 
CONCLUSION 
The Stat^ having conceded the substantive issue in this 
case, it appears that Appellant should be granted relief by this 
court. The State alleges a procedural error on the part of the 
Appellant by alleging a procedural recourse in the District Court 
which is not at all clear and which has no basis in statute or 
case law. Under the reasoning of the Breckenridqe case, the 
Defendant's substantive issues should be addressed and decided by 
this court. 
DATED this f *f day of fl\d^ 
19 JL2 7 
^7/iicdf.. ~7£j/-
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